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More than a dozen years ago, at the very end of his book, “The Age of Extremes”, 
Eric Hobsbawm, the noted historian of Capitalism and Empire, had observed:  “The 
twentieth century ended in a global disorder whose nature was unclear, and without an 
obvious mechanism for either ending it or keeping it under control…. The future cannot 
be a continuation of the past, and there are signs, both externally and, as it were, 
internally, that we have reached a point of historical crisis.” 1
At that time his prediction went virtually unheeded.  The Cold war had just come 
to an end. Capitalism had finally triumphed over socialism ending a two century-old 
ideological conflict. Its spread would be accompanied by the spread of democracy, and 
that would ensure peace. No wonder Francis Fukuyama predicted that the world would 
become a rather boring place2. 
 But few predictions have gone so spectacularly wrong. There is a progressive 
disorganisation of life in the industrialised market economies. Regulations that governed 
condition of work and pay have been thrown away; trade unions have either disintegrated 
or become shadows of their former selves. All of them are plagued by a phenomenon that 
they had not known for two hundred years—chronic, non-cyclical unemployment among 
the able bodied. The socialist economic system has disintegrated and an empire has 
crumbled.  Among the poor countries of the world state failure, resulting in generalised 
civil war or bouts of genocidal violence, is becoming  frequent. 
  Wars have not petered out but multiplied, and changed their form. The number of 
peacekeeping missions undertaken by the UN has skyrocketed3.  Military assaults by one 
or more nations on another without the sanction of the UN Security Council are 
becoming more, not less frequent. A new doctrine his been propounded to justify these 
assaults: ‘Deterrence’ does not work against non-state actors such as international 
terrorists. ‘Pre-emptive’ military action is, therefore, a surer guarantee of world peace4.  
This shift is undermining the three-century–old Westphalian state system, and 
threatening to  push the world back into Hobbes’ ‘State of Nature’. But as Hobbes had 
himself warned, the state of nature is a state of war. The new security doctrine has 
therefore already gone a long way towards erasing the time- tested  distinction between 
war and peace. To cope with this change the functions of the UN are being redefined: it is 
no longer the guardian of peace, but the janitor brought in to pick up the pieces of nation 
states after they have been demolished by these ‘necessary’ wars. There is even a new 
name for this function. It is called  ‘peace-building’. 
 There is no better proof of this change than resolution 1701 of the Security 
Council, on the war in Lebanon. Whereas only a few years earlier the UN Security 
Council would be convened within hours of the outbreak of hostilities in any part of the 
world, on this occasion it took the  Council five weeks to convene. And the resolution it 
passed did not contain a single word of condemnation of Israel. Instead it put all the 
blame for the ‘hundreds of deaths and injuries…, extensive damage to civilian 
infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons’, upon the 
Hezbollah. Israel was, no doubt, provoked by Hezbollah’s kidnapping of one soldier and 
killing of five more in the chase that followed, but its response was grossly 
disproportionate. What is more, it was not aimed at the Hezbollah but at the state of 
Lebanon, and almost entirely at its civilian population.  By not saying a word in 
condemnation of this response, the UN Security Council tacitly legitimised the US’ 
National Security doctrine, of 2002, in which defence would be based not upon 
deterrence but Pre-emptive assault, for it legitimised attacks upon a state in order to 
punish it for harbouring hostile non-state actors within it. Thus has the UN itself become 
the instrument for demolishing the UN. 
As the Westphalian state system has begun to unravel, time honoured 
international treaties and domestic laws have begun to come apart. Among the casualties 
are the Geneva convention on the treatment of prisoners of War and on torture; the 
International convention banning the use of chemical weapons, and domestic laws 
guaranteeing  individual freedom, the right to privacy and habeas corpus. Perhaps the 
most disturbing is the unravelling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, which has 
begun with North Korea’s announcement that it has carried out a nuclear explosion. It is 
both an effect and a contributory cause of the ever more rapid return to Hobbes’ State of 
Nature. 
The mounting chaos has touched off a frantic search for explanations. As the 
architect of the new security doctrine and prime mover behind every pre-emptive 
intervention, the US has been at the epicentre of the controversy that it has unleashed.  Its 
aggressiveness has been defended as an unavoidable response to the rise of global 
terrorism, and condemned as a product of the neo-conservatives’ thirst for Empire.  
But in popular debate and, regrettably, in the making of policy in the powerful 
nations of the world, there remains a strong touch of denial. The belief, fostered in the 
early nineties, that Globalisation would spread affluence; that affluence would strengthen, 
or release pressures for democracy, and that the spread of democracy would bring world 
peace, still remains strong5. Indeed it has now been given a new Messianic form. If it 
doesn’t happen automatically it must be made to happen, if necessary by the sword6. 
It is the contention of this paper that both the supporters and the critics of recent 
US policies credit it with far more capacity for autonomous action than it actually 
possesses. It suggests that the US itself is only a pawn of forces released by a vastly 
larger global convulsion. That convulsion began in the world economy more than thirty 
years ago, and it is what we refer to as Globalisation.  
Since Globalisation first manifested itself in the world economy more than three 
decades ago, most of its existing definitions – and there are many – have been framed in 
economic terms. But Globalisation is a far more inclusive change, which embraces not 
only the economic relations within and between states, but political relations as well.  All 
of these are being transformed almost simultaneously. The disorder it is creating is 
therefore systemic. It is enveloping us because Capitalism has burst the ‘container’ of the 
Nation State  and begun to turn a large part of the world into its new container. 
 The concept of a 'container' for capitalism was coined by the French historian  
Fernand Braudel7. It refers to the social, economic and political unit that is large enough 
to organise and contain all the interrelated functions of capitalism -- finance, production 
and marketing. While the linkages that define this unit are primarily economic, 
Capitalism’s need for a secure environment within which to operate turns it into a 
political and military unit as well.  
Technology is the engine that pushes the  growth of Capitalism's container, for 
each new development in it   enlarges the minimum economic scale of production. This is 
not, therefore, the first time that capitalism has burst its 'container'. Since its birth in the 
north Italian city states in the 13th century, Capitalism has done so on three other 
occasions. The first was when the hub of what was still a small largely European 
capitalist system shifted from the city states of Northern Italy, notably Genoa and Venice, 
to Amsterdam. The second jump took place from Amsterdam to Britain, and the third 
when Capitalism shifted its base from Britain to the US. The city state remained the 
container of capitalism during its first and second incarnations, but by the time capitalism 
made its next leap, it was too large to be contained within even a hybrid, nation-backed, 
city-state like Amsterdam, and needed to mould economic, technical and political 
relations in an entire nation state to turn it into its container. By the end of the 19th 
century Capitalism was outgrowing even the small nation state. So the USA replaced 
Britain as the hub of capitalism. But today Capitalism has outgrown even a large nation 
state and is making an incomparably larger jump than it did in any of its previous cycles 
of expansion is turning  a large part of the globe into its container. That is the process that  
the world refers to as Globalisation.  
Each new cycle of expansion has bee heralded by a ‘signal crisis’ when suddenly 
the global economic and political system suddenly loses the capacity to develop 
corrective responses to external shocks8.The first signs that it was doing so came in the 
early seventies, when, during the recession that followed the first oil price shock, the 
industrialised countries found that time honoured methods of dealing with recession, such 
as pump priming, no longer worked. All it did was to stimulate imports of manufactured 
goods without reviving domestic industry and its associated activities. This new 
phenomenon was promptly given a name -- stagflation. The imports were, moreover not 
coming from other industrialised countries but from the low wage, newly industrialised 
countries of Asia and Latin America. And , horror of horrors, most of these imports were 
being produced, or being licensed for production, by companies  that  been producing 
them in their home countries before.  
In the attempt to cope with this new situation industrialised countries have 
speedily dismantled most of the institutions that they had created to moderate social 
conflict within their societies between the gainers and losers from Capitalism – between 
Capital and Labour. Foremost among them were trade unions and several of the 
institutions and laws of the welfare state. The resulting decline in the bargaining power of 
the poor has led to a rapid widening of income inequalities, the emergence of chronic 
unemployment, and the return of pauperism after 200 years. It has also led to the collapse 
of the former socialist countries  and to the exclusion of  large number of the poorest 
countries of the world from the process of  trade based growth.  Hobsbawm has 
christened these the ‘crisis decades’. 
In the last three decades the world has come to accept, and live with, the disorder 
created by Economic globalisation. It has also gone some way towards building  new, and 
adapting existing,  international institutions that can help us to   cope with its worst 
effects. But as in previous cycles of capitalism, Global Capitalism needs the construction 
of a new political container as well – one that encompasses most, if not all, of the world. 
It is here that it has entered uncharted territory.  
One crucial asymmetry between economic and political globalisation is that while 
a market economy does tend to return equilibrium even after severe external shocks, there 
is no such self corrective mechanism in politics. In previous cycles, therefore, order has 
had to be restored by a hegemonic power, and its rise has invariably been preceded by a 
long period of violence. Thus north Italian city state system emerged after a 100 years of 
internecine war from 1420 to 1520.  Amsterdam emerged as the next hegemonic centre of 
power only after 80 years of war, 50 of them  between Holland and Spain and the last 
thirty a general conflict that came to be called the “Thirty years’ war.” The rise of Britain 
was preceded by almost sixty years of war between Britain and Holland and France, from 
the seven year War in 1756 till the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. This period also 
saw one failed and two successful revolutions in Holland (Batavia), and France and the 
United States. Finally the shift from the British to American cycle saw 41 years of 
turmoil, two world wars which killed about 80 million persons, and the Holocaust. 
There is a disturbing trend beneath these cycles. The construction of each new 
container has had to be accomplished in a shorter period, over a larger part of the globe, 
and has therefore involved more violence. Will this trend continue in the future? There is 
no automatic mechanism, like the market, that can ensure that it will not. 
The second reason why the world has entered uncharted territory is that while the 
struggle for power between gainers and losers that was unleashed by each of the previous 
transformations of capitalism took place within the framework of a pre-existent city or 
nation state, which could act as referee or moderator, there is no global counterpart that 
can perform this function during the creation of the global container for capitalism. We 
are breaking the mould and weakening or destroying the institutions of the nation state 
and nation –ate based capitalism, but without anything to take its place. Other than the 
natural aversion to violence, there is thus no choke, no moderator of the global conflict 
that is now erupting. And, as the late nineties and the first six years of this century have 
already shown, the natural inhibition to violence is wearing thin.    
  Most of the current disorder in the world results from attempts to build a new 
world order that are going wrong  and  yielding completely unanticipated side effects  
that have created more problems than the ones  the innovators set out to resolve. The 
disorder in the international state system that erupted after the Cold War necessitated an 
unprecedented increase in military interventions. Initially these were carried out with the 
consent of, and under the banner of the United Nations. But beginning with the aerial 
bombing of Serbia, the UN began to be bypassed. After 9/11 the US has decided to 
dispense with the consultative and consensual approach altogether and be guided solely 
by its on national interest and security perceptions. 
  Chaos is spreading because the US is not willing to recognise that the 
construction of the new global polity requires the suppression of nationalism not only in 
other nation states but in its own as well. Instead it is attempting to expand the perimeters 
of its own nation state to encompass the world. This is the true genesis of the drive 
towards Empire. It is also, unfortunately the genesis of international terrorism. Today the 
two are feeding off each other to snuff out democracy. 
The attempt to build an empire is in deep trouble, but even if it were to succeed it 
would be at the cost of more violence than human society can stand. The Empire project 
has locked the US and its allies into a relentless confrontation with smaller nation states 
and virtually ruled out accommodation as a way to create a stable world order.  
Confrontation has turned into  a no-holds-barred struggle to prevent the spread of nuclear 
technology on the one hand and chemical and biological weapons on the other. The 
struggle is further heightening the confrontation and the fear that dominates relations 
between nations. Atoms, germs and fear make a deadly cocktail.  
 
(The writer is a former editor of the Hindustan Times, New Delhi, India, and a former 
adviser to the Indian Prime minister. He is the author of a forthcoming book, “The 
Twilight of the Nation State: Globalisation, Chaos and War”, published by the University 
of Michigan Press.) 
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